Information acquisition and entry

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• dc.contributor.author Hurkens, Sjaak
• dc.contributor.author Vulkan, Nir
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:27:07Z
• dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:27:07Z
• dc.date.issued 1996-02-01
• dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:16:43Z
• dc.description.abstract Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they have the opportunity to buy information about several variables that might affect the profitability of this market. Our model differs from the existing literature on endogenous information acquisition in two respects: (1) there is uncertainty about more than one variable, and (2) information is acquired secretly. When the cost of acquiring information is small, entry decisions will be as if there was perfect information. Equilibria where each firm acquires only a small amount of information are more robust than the socially undesirable equilibria where all firms gather all information. Examples illustrate the importance of assumptions (1) and (2).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=155
• dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44(4): 467-479 (2001)
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20750
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 155
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title Information acquisition and entry
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper