Optimal magnitude and probability of fines

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• dc.contributor.author Garoupa, Nunoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z
• dc.date.issued 2000-04-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:05:12Z
• dc.description.abstract The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=454
• dc.identifier.citation European Economic Review, 45, 9, (2001) pp. 1765-1771
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/691
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 454
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword crime
• dc.subject.keyword probability and severity of sanctions
• dc.subject.keyword law enforcement
• dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
• dc.title Optimal magnitude and probability of finesca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper