Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees
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- dc.contributor.author Garoupa, Nunoca
- dc.contributor.author Gómez, Fernandoca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresaca
- dc.date.issued 2002-07-01ca
- dc.date.modified 2016-09-29T02:50:20Zca
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=639ca
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/391ca
- dc.language.iso engca
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 639ca
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsca
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ca
- dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organizationca
- dc.subject.keyword law firmsca
- dc.subject.keyword legal feesca
- dc.subject.keyword moral hazardca
- dc.subject.keyword risk-sharingca
- dc.title Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent feesca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca