Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

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  • dc.contributor.author Charness, Garyca
  • dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
  • dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:39Z
  • dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:39Z
  • dc.date.issued 1998-09-01
  • dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:03:56Z
  • dc.description.abstract Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-social behavior are diminished when an external authority is responsible for an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that a shift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchange experiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity (higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process than when it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slight shift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can change behavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economic environments featuring substantial personal interaction.
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
  • dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=322
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/854
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 322
  • dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
  • dc.subject.keyword responsibility
  • dc.subject.keyword social behavior
  • dc.subject.keyword experiment
  • dc.subject.keyword generosity
  • dc.subject.keyword leex
  • dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
  • dc.title Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experimentca
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper