A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

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  • dc.contributor.author Hart, Sergiuca
  • dc.contributor.author Mas-Colell, Andreuca
  • dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
  • dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:23Z
  • dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:23Z
  • dc.date.issued 1996-03-01
  • dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:02:53Z
  • dc.description.abstract We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive procedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. To compute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff function and the history of play. We also offer a variation where every player knows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
  • dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=200
  • dc.identifier.citation Econometrica, 68, 5, (2000), pp. 1127-1150,
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/525
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 200
  • dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
  • dc.subject.keyword correlated equilibrium
  • dc.subject.keyword nash equilibrium
  • dc.subject.keyword adaptive prodedure
  • dc.subject.keyword regret
  • dc.subject.keyword blackwell approachability
  • dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
  • dc.title A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibriumca
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper