Comparison of information structures
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- dc.contributor.author Gossner, Olivier
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:26:51Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:26:51Z
- dc.date.issued 1996-05-01
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:16:51Z
- dc.description.abstract We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say ${\cal I}$ and ${\cal J}$. First we say that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ when for every compact game $G$, all correlated equilibrium distributions of $G$ induced by ${\cal J}$ are also induced by ${\cal I}$. Second, we say that ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$ when all the players can compute from their information in ${\cal I}$ ``new information'' that they could have received from ${\cal J}$. We prove that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ if and only if ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=169
- dc.identifier.citation Games and Economic Behavior, num. 30, pp. 44-63, 2000
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/596
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 169
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword game--theory
- dc.subject.keyword information
- dc.subject.keyword correlation
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Comparison of information structures
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper