Property as sequential exchange : the forgotten limits of private contract

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• dc.contributor.author Arruñada, Benitoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2018-02-14T15:30:06Z
• dc.date.available 2018-02-14T15:30:06Z
• dc.date.issued 2017-01-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:17:57Z
• dc.description.abstract The contractual, single-exchange framework in Coase (1960) contains the implicit assumption that exchange in property rights does not affect future transaction (i.e., trading) costs. This is pertinent for analyzing use externalities but limits our understanding of property institutions: a central problem of property markets lies in the interaction among multiple transactions, which causes exchange-related and non-contractible externalities. By retaining a single-exchange simplification, the economic analysis of property has encouraged views that: (1) overemphasize the initial allocation of property rights, while some form of recurrent allocation is often needed; (2) pay scant attention to legal rights, although these determine enforceability and, therefore, economic value; and (3) overestimate the power of unregulated private ordering, despite its inability to protect third parties. These three biases have been misleading policy in many areas, including land titling and business firm formalization.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1547
• dc.identifier.citation
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27920
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1547
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword property rights
• dc.subject.keyword externalities
• dc.subject.keyword enforcement
• dc.subject.keyword transaction costs
• dc.subject.keyword public ordering
• dc.subject.keyword private ordering
• dc.subject.keyword impersonal exchange
• dc.subject.keyword organized markets
• dc.subject.keyword Blockchains (Databases)
• dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
• dc.title Property as sequential exchange : the forgotten limits of private contractca
• dc.title.alternative
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper