Fiscal targeting
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- dc.contributor.author Barnichon, Régis
- dc.contributor.author Mesters, Geert
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:09:31Z
- dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:09:31Z
- dc.date.issued 2021-07-26
- dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T10:08:11Z
- dc.description.abstract Fiscal rules are widely used to constrain policy decisions and promote fiscal discipline, but the design of flexible yet effective rules has proved a formidable task. In this paper, we propose to implement fiscal constraints through a fiscal targeting framework, paralleling central banks' move from monetary rules to inflation targeting. Under fiscal targeting, fiscal policy makers must optimally balance some fiscal objectives (e.g., keeping the deficit below 3%) with their own policy objectives (e.g., stabilizing output at potential). Fiscal targeting can be implemented with minimal assumption on the underlying economic model, and it promises a number of benefits over commonly used fiscal rules: (i) stronger buy-in from policy makers, (ii) higher fiscal discipline, (iii) transparency and ease of monitoring.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1793
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68545
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1793
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword fiscal rule
- dc.subject.keyword impulse responses
- dc.subject.keyword forecasting
- dc.subject.keyword stability and growth pact.
- dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
- dc.title Fiscal targeting
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper