Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
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- dc.contributor.author Hauk, Estherca
- dc.contributor.author Hurkens, Sjaakca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:49:58Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:49:58Z
- dc.date.issued 1996-03-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:03:11Z
- dc.description.abstract Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the unrealistic assumption that firms observe the precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of heterogeneous duopoly it is shown that comparative statics results partly depend on the observability assumption.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=233
- dc.identifier.citation Economic Theory, 18, 3, (2001), pp. 661-681
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/561
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 233
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword information acquisition
- dc.subject.keyword oligopoly
- dc.subject.keyword uncertainty
- dc.subject.keyword bayesian equilibrium
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Secret information acquisition in Cournot marketsca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper