A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior: Nash versus Kant
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- dc.contributor.author De Donder, Philippe
- dc.contributor.author Llavador, Humberto
- dc.contributor.author Penczynski, Stefan
- dc.contributor.author Roemer, John E.
- dc.contributor.author Vélez, Roberto
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:09:54Z
- dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:09:54Z
- dc.date.issued 2021-12-01
- dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T10:08:19Z
- dc.description.abstract Whether or not to vaccinate one's child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an increasingly prevalent behavior, due to deleterious side effects that parents believe may accompany vaccination. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash behavioral protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. Because of the positive externality that each child's vaccination generates for others, the Nash equilibrium suffers from a free-rider problem. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively -they may optimize according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We test, on a sample of six countries, whether childhood vaccination behavior conforms better to the individualistic or cooperative protocol. In order to do so, we conduct surveys of parents in these countries, to ascertain the distribution of beliefs concerning the subjective probability and severity of deleterious side effects of vaccination. We show that in all the countries of our sample the Kant model dominates the Nash model. We conjecture that, due to the free-rider problem inherent in the Nash equilibrium, a social norm has evolved, quite generally, inducing parents to vaccinate with higher probability than they would in the non-cooperative solution. Kantian equilibrium offers one precise version of such a social norm.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1808
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68636
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1808
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword kantian equilibrium
- dc.subject.keyword nash equilibrium
- dc.subject.keyword vaccination
- dc.subject.keyword social norm
- dc.title A game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior: Nash versus Kant
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper