The donor problem
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- dc.contributor.author Abbink, Klausca
- dc.contributor.author Ellman, Matthewca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:49:59Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:49:59Z
- dc.date.issued 2004-10-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:08:54Z
- dc.description.abstract Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for selecting them. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (e.g. by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. We design an experimental game representing the donor s problem. In one treatment, the intermediary selects recipients. In the other, selection is random - as by an uninformed donor. In our data, random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. Selection distortions are similar, but intermediaries embezzle more when they have selection power and (correctly) expect fewer complaints.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=796
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/891
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 796
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword development
- dc.subject.keyword entitlement
- dc.subject.keyword experiments
- dc.subject.keyword fairness
- dc.subject.keyword intermediaries
- dc.subject.keyword monitoring
- dc.subject.keyword targeting
- dc.subject.keyword punishment.
- dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
- dc.subject.keyword Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
- dc.title The donor problemca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper