Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest
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- dc.contributor.author Ellman, Matthewca
- dc.contributor.author Wantchekon, Leonardca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:41:09Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:41:09Z
- dc.date.issued 1999-08-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:05:14Z
- dc.description.abstract We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=457
- dc.identifier.citation The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 2, 2000, pp. 499-531
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1155
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 457
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword electoral competition
- dc.subject.keyword political unrest
- dc.subject.keyword asymmetric information
- dc.subject.keyword platform divergence
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Electoral competition under the threat of political unrestca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper