Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games
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- dc.contributor.author Penalva, José S.ca
- dc.contributor.author Ryall, Michael D.ca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:12Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:12Z
- dc.date.issued 2001-05-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:05:27Z
- dc.description.abstract Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when the empirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behavior strategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behavior strategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization of empirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's information structure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributions it generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunity diagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a given extensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summary of the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=483
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/356
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 483
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword causality
- dc.subject.keyword structural uncertainty
- dc.subject.keyword extensive form games
- dc.subject.keyword Finance and Accounting
- dc.title Causal assessment in finite extensive-form gamesca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper