Show simple item record Germano, Fabrizio Lugosi, Gábor
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2020-05-25T09:27:10Z 2020-05-25T09:27:10Z 2005-10-01
dc.identifier.citation Economic Theory (2007) 32: 575-578
dc.description.abstract We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 907
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2020-05-25T09:21:06Z
dc.subject.keyword correlated equilibrium
dc.subject.keyword finite games
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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