dc.contributor.author |
Germano, Fabrizio |
dc.contributor.author |
Lugosi, Gábor |
dc.contributor.other |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
dc.date.accessioned |
2020-05-25T09:27:10Z |
dc.date.available |
2020-05-25T09:27:10Z |
dc.date.issued |
2005-10-01 |
dc.identifier |
https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=907 |
dc.identifier.citation |
Economic Theory (2007) 32: 575-578 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/551 |
dc.description.abstract |
We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N. |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 907 |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons |
dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.title |
Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.date.modified |
2020-05-25T09:21:06Z |
dc.subject.keyword |
correlated equilibrium |
dc.subject.keyword |
finite games |
dc.subject.keyword |
Microeconomics |
dc.subject.keyword |
Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods |
dc.rights.accessRights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |