Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria

Germano, Fabrizio; Lugosi, Gábor

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dc.contributor.author	Germano, Fabrizio
dc.contributor.author	Lugosi, Gábor
dc.contributor.other	Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned	2020-05-25T09:27:10Z
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T09:27:10Z
dc.date.issued	2005-10-01
dc.identifier	https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=907
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Theory (2007) 32: 575-578
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10230/551
dc.description.abstract	We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 907
dc.rights	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title	Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified	2020-05-25T09:21:06Z
dc.subject.keyword	correlated equilibrium
dc.subject.keyword	finite games
dc.subject.keyword	Microeconomics
dc.subject.keyword	Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess