Show simple item record Ventura, Jaume
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2020-05-25T09:27:09Z 2020-05-25T09:27:09Z 2019-07-01
dc.identifier.citation Journal of the European Economic Association, 17 (6), 2019, 1723-1752
dc.description.abstract This paper develops a simple theoretical framework to study a set of regions, each with its own regional government, who share a union or central government. These governments must decide whether to implement or discard a large number of projects that produce local beneÖts for the region that implements them, and externalities for the rest of the regions. Conáict or disagreement arises since di§erent regions value projects di§erently. The classic assignment problem consists of deciding who decides these projects, either the union or the regional governments. It is well known that regional governments are insensitive to externalities. The key observation here is that the union government is insensitive to local benefits. Thus, each government maximizes only a piece of the value of projects, and disregards the other one. This observations leads to simple and clear rules for solving the assignment problem.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1664
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Sharing a government
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2020-05-25T09:26:02Z
dc.subject.keyword european integration
dc.subject.keyword centralization and decentralization
dc.subject.keyword public goods
dc.subject.keyword externalities
dc.subject.keyword fiscal federalism.
dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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