Villanova, RamonParadís, JaumeViader Canals, PelegríMiralles, JoanUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-262002-10-01Keio Economic Studies, 48, 69-96, 2012http://hdl.handle.net/10230/477It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical Cournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked, in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stable unique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolists as industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instability is proved false.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPapercournot equilibriumnon-cooperative oligopolyquasi-competitivenessstabilityStatistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methodsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess