Autocrats' modes of exit, rents, and crisis in Africa

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• dc.contributor.author Escribà-Folch, Abel
• dc.date.accessioned 2021-06-18T08:19:43Z
• dc.date.available 2021-06-18T08:19:43Z
• dc.date.issued 2010
• dc.description.abstract Studies analyzing dictators’ duration in power do not generally distinguish the way through which rulers are booted out. In consequence, a destabilizing effect is attributed to some variables without specifying and testing the mechanisms through which this effect may operate. In this paper, we argue that ‘regular’ leadership changes stem from the incumbent’s incapacity to thwart elite defection and opposition groups coordination through the use of patronage, whereas, ‘irregular’ changes are mainly brought about by economic collapse and the widespread of poverty. We also analyze the patterns behind the steady institutionalization of African politics. Data from all African countries between 1946 (or the year of independence) and 2000 permit us to put such general hypotheses under scrutiny and confirm them using multinomial logistic duration regressions. It is also shown that foreign pressure, aid conditionality and domestic opposition have been the major determinants of institutionalization of African dictatorships, making, thus, possible the decrease in the number of irregular ousters.en
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Escribà-Folch A. Autocrats' modes of exit, rents, and crisis in Africa. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. 2010 Oct 31;4(7):272-83. DOI: 10.5897/AJPSIR.9000013
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.5897/AJPSIR.9000013
• dc.identifier.issn 1996-0832
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/47933
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Academic Journal
• dc.relation.ispartof African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. 2010 Oct 31;4(7):272-83
• dc.rights All articles published by the African Journal of Political Science and International Relations are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Regular leadership changesen
• dc.subject.keyword Irregular changesen
• dc.subject.keyword Africaen
• dc.subject.keyword Institutionalizationen
• dc.title Autocrats' modes of exit, rents, and crisis in Africaen
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion