Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information
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- dc.contributor.author Germano, Fabrizioca
- dc.contributor.author Weinstein, Jonathanca
- dc.contributor.author Zuazo-Garin, Peioca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2018-02-14T15:30:07Z
- dc.date.available 2018-02-14T15:30:07Z
- dc.date.issued 2016-12-16
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:17:58Z
- dc.description.abstract Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989) Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICR-x, where x is a sequence whose n-th term is the probability players attach to (n - 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity holds when higher-order belief in rationality remains above some threshold (constant x), but fails when higher-order belief in rationality eventually becomes low enough (x converging to 0).
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1548
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27992
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1548
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword robustness
- dc.subject.keyword rationalizability
- dc.subject.keyword bounded rationality
- dc.subject.keyword incomplete information
- dc.subject.keyword belief hierarchies
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete informationen
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper