The three-point rule in the Spanish football league : an econometric analysis

Abstract

In 1995 the reward for a victory was increased from two to three points in most European football leagues, in order to encourage teams to adopt attacking strategies. This setting provides an interesting experiment for studying the effects of a reward increase in tournaments. In this paper we evaluate if the objectives of the principal with the implementation of the three-point rule were achieved. Focusing on recent seasons of the Spanish football league, we contrast our results with previous literature on the subject which analysed earlier seasons. We identify that many variables behave differently nowadays, up to the point that average shots have doubled and average fouls per season seem to have reached a steady state. By running statistical tests and regressions, we conclude that team budgets are the most determining factor in today’s playing performance. We also find that strategies adjust smoothly throughout seasons, showing that the role of the incentive change has been downplayed.