The microeconomics of corruption. A review of thirty years of research

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• dc.contributor.author Burguet, Robertoca
• dc.contributor.author Ganuza, Juan-Joséca
• dc.contributor.author Garcia Montalvo, Joséca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:48Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:48Z
• dc.date.issued 2016-05-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:17:32Z
• dc.description.abstract We review microeconomic research on corruption from the last thirty years. We start by analyzing the seminal models of corruption built on three-tier, delegation models. Then, go into more details of the context of corrupt deals, and discuss the main economic factors that a¤ect corruption. We discuss incentives and compensation in bureaucracies, and the interplay of market and bureaucratic structure. Competition and contract design will also be reviewed in relation to procurement under corruptible agents. After reviewing the theoretical contributions, we turn to the empirical evidence. We begin discussing measurement issues, and then move to the analysis of the empirical evidence relative to the theoretical models discussed in previous sections. Finally, we cover several anti-corruption mechanisms proposed in the literature and discuss their relative merits as devices to control or eliminate illegal activities.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1525
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/26844
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1525
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword corruption
• dc.subject.keyword bribes
• dc.subject.keyword deterrence
• dc.subject.keyword bureaucracy
• dc.subject.keyword competition
• dc.subject.keyword game theory
• dc.subject.keyword and mechanism design.
• dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
• dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
• dc.subject.keyword Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
• dc.title The microeconomics of corruption. A review of thirty years of researchca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper