Rescuing basic equality

Parr, Tom; Slavny, Adam

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12285

Rescuing basic equality

Citation

Parr T, Slavny A. Rescuing basic equality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2019 Sep;100(3):837-57. DOI: 10.1111/papq.12285

Abstract

In the debate on the basis of moral equality, one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all accounts that ground equality in the possession of some psychological capacity (Psychological Capacity Accounts). This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections.