Why do owners let their managers pay too much for their acquisitions?

dc.contributor.author Faulí, Ramon
dc.contributor.author Motta, Massimo
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:10:00Z
dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:10:00Z
dc.date.issued 1994-10-01
dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T09:56:32Z
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=94
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 4/4, 497-514, Winter 1996
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20877
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 94
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.keyword Finance and Accounting
dc.title Why do owners let their managers pay too much for their acquisitions?
dc.title.alternative Managerial Incentives for Takeovers
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper

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