Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies

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• dc.contributor.author Apaydin, Fulya
• dc.contributor.author Jordana, Jacint
• dc.date.accessioned 2021-02-23T08:34:35Z
• dc.date.available 2021-02-23T08:34:35Z
• dc.date.issued 2020
• dc.description.abstract Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have a significant capability to choose how to implement their decisions to be effective, given the mix of managerial autonomy, supervisory powers and political independence that most of these agencies enjoy. As such, traditional approaches which focus on their institutional characteristics or their reputational problems do not fully capture the variation in IRAs’ behavior. This paper suggests a complementary approach to interpreting IRAs’ autonomous behavior, focusing on the possibilities that the practice of accountability offers to these public agencies to make relevant choices for the agency itself and the policy environment. To that end, we identify a key background variable that affects the practice of IRAs, namely, the varying power configurations existing among the regulatees and focus on how this factor shapes their voluntary accountability in different contexts. Lastly, we examine several cases of IRA accountability behavior to discuss whether the patterns we submit might constitute a starting point for a theoretical development on the use of accountability by IRAs.
• dc.description.sponsorship This research was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Industry and Competitiveness under the ACCOUNTREG Project (Grant CSO2012-396939).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Apaydin F, Jordana J. Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies. International Review of Public Policy. 2020;2(3):342-57. DOI: 10.4000/irpp.1458
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1458
• dc.identifier.issn 2679-3873
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46571
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher International Public Policy Association
• dc.relation.ispartof International Review of Public Policy. 2020;2(3):342-57
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/CSO2012-396939
• dc.rights International Review of Public Policy is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Regulation
• dc.subject.keyword Independence
• dc.subject.keyword Voluntary accountability
• dc.subject.keyword Regulatory governance
• dc.subject.keyword Delegation
• dc.subject.keyword Asymmetries of power
• dc.title Varying power configurations and the accountability of independent regulatory agencies
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion