Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models
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- dc.contributor.author Merkl, Christianca
- dc.contributor.author Van Rens, Thijs, 1973-ca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:22Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:22Z
- dc.date.issued 2011-09-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:13:56Z
- dc.description.abstract Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standard search models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfare is lower if hiring is selective.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1277
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19898
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1277
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword labor market models
- dc.subject.keyword welfare
- dc.subject.keyword optimal unemployment insurance
- dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
- dc.title Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market modelsca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper