Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in a trust game

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• dc.contributor.author Attanasi, Giuseppe
• dc.contributor.author Battigalli, Pierpaolo
• dc.contributor.author Manzoni, Elena
• dc.contributor.author Nagel, Rosemarie
• dc.date.accessioned 2025-05-26T13:55:21Z
• dc.date.available 2025-05-26T13:55:21Z
• dc.date.issued 2025
• dc.date.updated 2025-05-26T13:55:21Z
• dc.description Data de publicació electrònica: 07-04-2025
• dc.description.abstract Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, other-regarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of a Trust Game, assuming that the trustee's choice may be affected by a combination of guilt aversion and intention-based reciprocity. We recover trustees' belief-dependent preferences from their answers to a structured questionnaire. In the main treatment, the answers are disclosed and made common knowledge within each matched pair, while in the control treatment there is no disclosure. Our main auxiliary assumption is that such disclosure approximately implements a psychological game with complete information. To organize the data, we classify subjects according to their elicited preferences, and test predictions for the two treatments using both rationalizability and equilibrium. We find that, while preferences are heterogeneous, guilt aversion is the prevalent psychological motivation, and that behavior and elicited beliefs move in the direction predicted by the theory.
• dc.description.sponsorship Attanasi gratefully acknowledges financial support by the ERC (Grant DU283953), "Attractivité" IDEX2013 (University of Strasbourg), the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) under Grant ANR-18-E26-0018 (Project GRICRIS), the Italian Ministry of Universities and Research under Grant PRIN 2022 n. 20229LRAHK (funded by the European Union - Next Generation EU, Mission 4 Component 1, CUP B53D23012680006), the Sapienza University under Ateneo Grants 2023 for project n. RG123188B4CEE028, and the D34Health through the PNC-Spoke3 program research project "Wearable technologies, sensors, and biomarkers for care through digital twin approaches", under Grant B53C22006120001. P. Battigalli gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the ERC (Grant 324219). R. Nagel gratefully acknowledges financial support by FEDER/Ministerio de Ciencia de Innovación (Agencia Estatal de Investigación) through Grant ECO2008-01768, ECO2011-25295, PID2021-125538NB-I00 and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Attanasi G, Battigalli P, Manzoni E, Nagel R. Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in a trust game. Econ Theory. 2025 Apr 7. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01645-5
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-025-01645-5
• dc.identifier.issn 0938-2259
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/70496
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Springer
• dc.relation.ispartof Economic Theory. 2025 Apr 7
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/283953
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/324219
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/ECO2008-01768
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/ECO2011-25295
• dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PE/PID2021-125538NB-I00
• dc.rights This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• dc.subject.keyword Experiments
• dc.subject.keyword Trust game
• dc.subject.keyword Guilt
• dc.subject.keyword Reciprocity
• dc.subject.keyword Complete information
• dc.subject.keyword Incomplete information
• dc.title Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in a trust game
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion