Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

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• dc.contributor.author Germano, Fabrizioca
• dc.contributor.author Zuazo-Garin, Peioca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z
• dc.date.issued 2012-06-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:14:36Z
• dc.description.abstract We extend Aumann's [3] theorem, deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i?I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a type of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one, with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interim types, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1326
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19881
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1326
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword approximate common knowledge
• dc.subject.keyword bounded rationality
• dc.subject.keyword p-rational belief system
• dc.subject.keyword correlated equilibrium
• dc.subject.keyword incomplete information
• dc.subject.keyword non-cooperative game.
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibriaca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper