Political and stakeholder’s ties in European Union agencies

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• dc.contributor.author Pérez Durán, Ixchel
• dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-12T10:59:12Z
• dc.date.available 2020-05-12T10:59:12Z
• dc.date.issued 2019
• dc.description Supplemental material files: Data details, Acronyms and full names of European Union Agencies, Weighted models
• dc.description.abstract Some scholars consider that European Union agencies (EAs) were created as independent bodies in order to enhance the credibility of the European Union decision-making process. Scholars have typically focused on analysing the relationship that these agencies have with politicians. However, relatively little attention has been paid to their relationship with stakeholders. This study examines the professional trajectory of EA board members, identifying their career ties with politicians and stakeholders. Using an original dataset on the career trajectories of 338 top officials in 33 EAs, the findings provide evidence that the type of appointing body matters: on the one hand, the European Parliament is more likely – than the Commission – to appoint individuals having career ties to politicians; on the other hand, multiple veto players are less likely to designate board members linked to political players. Additionally, the findings suggest that agencies performing regulatory tasks seem to be more inclined to have lower levels of de facto independence from politicians.
• dc.description.sponsorship Research for this article was financially supported by a research grant of the Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca (2015DEMOC00011).
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
• dc.identifier.citation Pérez-Durán I. Political and stakeholder’s ties in European Union agencies. Journal of European Public Policy. 2019;26(1):1-22. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1375545
• dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1375545
• dc.identifier.issn 1350-1763
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44509
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.publisher Taylor & Francis
• dc.relation.ispartof Journal of European Public Policy. 2019;26(1):1-22
• dc.relation.isreferencedby https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5422816.v1
• dc.rights © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Pérez-Durán I. Political and stakeholder’s ties in European Union agencies. Journal of European Public Policy. 2019;26(1):1-22. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1375545. on 2019, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13501763.2017.1375545.
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.subject.keyword EU agencies
• dc.subject.keyword Management boards
• dc.subject.keyword Regulation
• dc.subject.keyword Regulatory agencies
• dc.title Political and stakeholder’s ties in European Union agencies
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
• dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion