Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
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- dc.contributor.author Eeckhout, Janca
- dc.contributor.author Kircher, Philipp Albert Theodorca
- dc.date.accessioned 2016-02-22T11:43:46Z
- dc.date.available 2016-02-22T11:43:46Z
- dc.date.issued 2010ca
- dc.description.abstract In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer’s meeting probability. Under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante. Only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non-rival, price posting is not an equilibrium. Multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions.en
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier.citation Eeckhout J, Kircher P. Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms. J Econ Theory. 2010;145(4):1354-85.ca
- dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005ca
- dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531ca
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/25920
- dc.language.iso engca
- dc.publisher Elsevierca
- dc.relation.ispartof Journal of Economic Theory. 2010;145(4):1354-85.ca
- dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/208068ca
- dc.rights © Elsevier http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005ca
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
- dc.subject.keyword Competing Mechanism Designen
- dc.subject.keyword Matching Functionen
- dc.subject.keyword Meeting Functionen
- dc.subject.keyword Sortingen
- dc.subject.keyword Screeningen
- dc.subject.keyword Price Postingen
- dc.subject.keyword Auctionsen
- dc.subject.other Preusca
- dc.subject.other Competència econòmica -- Models matemàticsca
- dc.title Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanismsca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/articleca
- dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionca