Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games
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- dc.contributor.author Germano, Fabrizio
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:26:48Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:26:48Z
- dc.date.issued 2004-06-01
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:20:16Z
- dc.description.abstract The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=761
- dc.identifier.citation Theory and Decision (2007) 62: 311-333
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1017
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 761
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword rules
- dc.subject.keyword evolutionary dynamics
- dc.subject.keyword stochastic dynamics
- dc.subject.keyword bounded rationality
- dc.subject.keyword learning
- dc.subject.keyword normal form games
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper