Existential sentences with existential quantification

McNally, Louise, 1965-

Existential sentences with existential quantification

Citació

McNally L. Existential sentences with existential quantification. Linguist Philos. 1998;21(4):353-92. DOI 10.1023/A:1005389330615.

Descripció

The analysis to be proposed has two notable consequences. First, it indicates that while presupposition may play a role in accounting for the so-called definiteness restriction associated with the construction, presupposition cannot account for all of the definiteness restriction facts-in fact, on the view defended here, the definiteness restriction facts cannot be explained by a single generalization. Second, it supports the view that the notions weak and strong should be redefined as suggested in Ladusaw 1994, where “weak” is essentially equated with “nonparticular-denoting”.