On deontic truth and values

Moreso, Josep Joan

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181

On deontic truth and values

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Moreso JJ. On Deontic Truth and Values. Crítica: revista hispanoamericana de filosofía. 2017 Oct 31;49(146):61-74. DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181

Abstract

This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended byAlchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestiveconception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalentto thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativistconception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts ofethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of theproof; b) aversion of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. Thisarticle presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show thatthey are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in thenormative sphere.