Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

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• dc.contributor.author Aragonés, Enriquetaca
• dc.contributor.author Palfrey, Thomas R.ca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:59Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:59Z
• dc.date.issued 2000-09-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:05:42Z
• dc.description.abstract This paper examines competition in the standard one- dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=502
• dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 1, (2002), pp. 131-161
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/351
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 502
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword spatial competition
• dc.subject.keyword mixed strategies
• dc.subject.keyword candidate quality
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidateca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper