Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study
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- dc.contributor.author Nagel, Rosemarieca
- dc.contributor.author Cabrales, Antonioca
- dc.contributor.author Armenter, Rocca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresaca
- dc.date.issued 2002-02-01ca
- dc.date.modified 2016-09-29T02:50:19Zca
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=601ca
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/750ca
- dc.language.iso engca
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 601ca
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsca
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ca
- dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economicsca
- dc.subject.keyword global gamesca
- dc.subject.keyword risk dominanceca
- dc.subject.keyword equilibrium selectionca
- dc.subject.keyword common knowledgeca
- dc.subject.keyword leexca
- dc.title Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental studyca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca