Electoral coordination and party system institutionalization

Lago Peñas, Ignacio; Torcal, Mariano

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068818795191

Electoral coordination and party system institutionalization

Citation

Lago I, Torcal M. Electoral coordination and party system institutionalization. Party Politics. 2019 Feb 28;26(5):570-80. DOI: 10.1177/1354068818795191

Abstract

A new theoretical development for examining the institutionalization of party systems is proposed in this article. We build on electoral coordination theories to disaggregate volatility into the vote transfers that occur between or towards parties that are in equilibrium (which we call endogenous volatility) and those that are not (exogenous volatility). The former captures accountability, and the latter reflects the number of voters who are not acting in accordance with the existing equilibrium in the party system. Exogenous volatility measures the institutionalization of party systems. We also show that endogenous volatility depends on government performance, while exogenous volatility is a function of institutional openness. The empirical evidence comes from an original data set that includes 448 electoral cycles in lower-house elections in 66 countries between 1977 and 2011.