An economic explanation of the nationalization of electoral politics

Lago Peñas, Ignacio; Lago Peñas, Santiago

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.10.011

An economic explanation of the nationalization of electoral politics

Citation

Lago I, Lago-Peñas S. An economic explanation of the nationalization of electoral politics. Elect Stud. 2016 Oct 28;44:409-18. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2016.10.011

Abstract

The literature on the nationalization of electoral politics focuses on the institutional characteristics of political regimes and the structure and organization of social cleavages. We argue that the nationalization of electoral politics is also driven by economic performance. Economic perturbations increase vote transfers from large (and highly nationalized) parties to small (and weakly nationalized) parties. Permissive electoral systems exacerbate the influence of economic performance on nationalization. Pooled cross-sectional time-series regression analysis is conducted on data from 43 countries and 475 elections between 1950 and 2012. The party-level mechanisms are shown through a closer look at Austria, Portugal and Ireland.