Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

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• dc.contributor.author Arruñada, Benitoca
• dc.contributor.author Andonova, Veneta Stefanovaca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:20Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:20Z
• dc.date.issued 2004-12-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:08:57Z
• dc.description.abstract Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=801
• dc.identifier.citation Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley, eds., Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Dordrecht, Springer, 2005, 229-250
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/370
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 801
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword legal systems
• dc.subject.keyword institutional development
• dc.subject.keyword law enforcement
• dc.subject.keyword Management and Organization Studies
• dc.title Market institutions and judicial rulemakingca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper