Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

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dc.contributor.authorJellal, Mohamedca
dc.contributor.authorGaroupa, Nunoca
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresaca
dc.date.issued1999-06-01ca
dc.date.modified2016-09-29T02:50:14Zca
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca
dc.identifierhttps://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=401ca
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal of Law and Economics, 14, 1 (2002), pp. 5-13ca
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/1168ca
dc.language.isoengca
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics and Business Working Papers Series; 401ca
dc.rightsL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ca
dc.subject.keywordBusiness Economics and Industrial Organizationca
dc.subject.keywordfineca
dc.subject.keywordprobability of detectionca
dc.subject.keywordasymmetry of informationca
dc.titleOptimal law enforcement under asymmetric informationca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca

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