Authoritarian institutions and regime survival: transitions to democracy and subsequent autocracy

Wright, Joseph (Joseph George), 1976-; Escribà-Folch, Abel

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000317

Authoritarian institutions and regime survival: transitions to democracy and subsequent autocracy

Citation

Wright J, Escribà-Folch A. Authoritarian institutions and regime survival: transitions to democracy and subsequent autocracy. Br J Polit Sci. 2011 Sep 26;42(2):283-309. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123411000317

Abstract

This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus increase the likelihood of democratization. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1946 to 2002 and accounting for simultaneity, the analysis models transitions to democracy and to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Results indicate that authoritarian legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Authoritarian parties, however, are associated with a higher likelihood of democratization.