Welcome to the UPF Digital Repository

Size, fungibility and the strengh of lobbying organizations

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Levine, David K.
dc.contributor.author Modica, Salvatore
dc.date.accessioned 2016-09-15T13:09:09Z
dc.date.available 2016-09-15T13:09:09Z
dc.date.issued 2016-05
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/27294
dc.description.abstract How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying? We consider a simple model of collusive organizations that provide a public good in the form of effort and have a fixed cost per member of acting collusively. Our key result is that the willingness of such a group to pay for a/ngiven prize depends on whether the prize is fungible - that is, whether the prize can be used to pay for itself. If the prize is fungible, as in the case of a transfer payment, a smaller group always has an advantage. If the prize is non-fungible - civil rights for example - willingness to pay first increases then decreases with the size of the group. We use the theory to study agenda setting/nboth with and without blackmail by the politician showing that in general the small group is not too greedy: when it wins it optimally chooses to pre-empt the large group by choosing a prize small enough to equal the large group participation cost.
dc.description.sponsorship The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries ADEMU Working Paper Series;22
dc.rights This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.title Size, fungibility and the strengh of lobbying organizations
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.subject.keyword Organization
dc.subject.keyword Group
dc.subject.keyword Collusion
dc.subject.keyword Public good
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/649396
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search


My Account


Compliant to Partaking