Vladasel, TheodorParker, Simon C.Sloof, Randolphvan Praag, Mirjam2024-05-162024-05-162024Vladasel T, Parker SC, Sloof R, van Praag M. Revenue drift, incentives, and effort allocation in social enterprises. J Econ Manag Strategy. 2024 Fall;33(3):630-51. DOI: 10.1111/jems.125901058-6407http://hdl.handle.net/10230/60171Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix.Revenue drift, whereby insufficient attention is given to economic, relative to social, goals, threatens social enterprise performance and survival. We argue that financial incentives can address this problem by redirecting employee attention to commercial tasks and attracting workers less inclined to fixate on social tasks. In an online experiment with varying incentive levels, monetary rewards succeed in directing worker effort to commercial tasks; high-powered incentives attract less prosocial employees, but low-powered incentives do not alter workforce composition. Social enterprises combining monetary rewards with a social mission not only attract more workers but are also able to guard against revenue drift.application/pdfeng© 2024 The Authors. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial‐NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non‐commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.Incentius (Economia)Incentius laboralsEmpreses -- Responsabilitat socialinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12590info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess