Motta, MassimoUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2024-11-142024-11-142022-12-01http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68578Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including "selfpreferencing" and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss in particular a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative CommonsSelf-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse casesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperself-preferencingabuse of dominancemonopolizationexclusionary practicesdigital platformstwo-sided marketsvertical foreclosureMicroeconomicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess