Cabrales, AntonioCharness, GaryCorchón, LuisUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-261998-06-01Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, (2003), pp. 161-193,http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1229We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperimplementationexperimentsmechanismsleexBehavioral and Experimental Economicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess