Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín2024-03-152024-03-152014Verdejo VM. Disbelieving the normativity of content. Acta Anal. 2014;29:441-56. DOI: 10.1007/s12136-014-0219-70353-5150http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59421Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, which is based on possession conditions for pure thinking or mere entertaining. I argue that the alternative approach has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature and has two important merits. First, it yields a direct analysis of the normativity of mental content, which is, furthermore, independent of arguably non-normative notions such as truth. Second, the approach suggests new and challenging lines of response to central non-normativist objections.application/pdfengThis version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0219-7info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0219-7Mental contentNormativity of contentNormativity of beliefInferential role semanticsPossession conditionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess