Mariella, GonzalesLeón-Ciliotta, GianmarcoMartinez, Luis R.Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2020-05-252020-05-252018-12-01http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44697We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the ne point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative CommonsHow effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy<resourceType xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" resourceTypeGeneral="Other">info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper</resourceType><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">voter turnout</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">voter registration</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">compulsory voting</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">informational frictions</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">external validity</subject><subject xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3" subjectScheme="keyword">peru</subject><rights xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-3">info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</rights>