Fumagalli, ChiaraMotta, Massimo2025-07-012024Fumagalli C, Motta M. Economic principles for the enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions. J Compet Law Econ. 2024;20(1-2):85-107. DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhae0031744-6414http://hdl.handle.net/10230/70811The European Commission (EC) has recently announced its intention to issue Guidelines on exclusionary abuses. In this paper, we explain how economics can and should be used to inform a sound and effects-based approach in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. In particular, the EC should be guided only by a consumer welfare standard; exclusive dealing and exclusivity rebates should be subject to a (rebuttable) presumption of harm; price-cost tests are meaningful only for predation and other practices that do not reference rivals; essentiality of the input should not be a requirement for vertical foreclosure cases of any type, but such cases should be limited only to dominant firms that satisfy certain criteria.application/pdfeng© Oxford University Press. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Competition Law & Economics following peer review. The version of record Fumagalli C, Motta M. Economic principles for the enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions. J Compet Law Econ. 2024;20(1-2):85-107. DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhae003 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae003 and https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article-abstract/20/1-2/85/7631485MonopolisCompetència -- Dret i legislacióContractes d'exclusivitatinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article2025-07-01http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae003info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess