Garoupa, NunoUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-261999-03-01http://hdl.handle.net/10230/941In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperorganized crimepunishmentplea-bargainingBusiness Economics and Industrial Organizationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess