Deserranno, ErikaLeón-Ciliotta, GianmarcoWitoelar, Firman2025-01-282025-01-282023Deserranno E, León-Ciliotta G, Witoelar F. When transparency fails: financial incentives for local banking agents in Indonesia. Rev Econ Stat. 2023 July 24. DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_013590034-6535http://hdl.handle.net/10230/69332Data de publicació electrònica: 24-07-2023Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix.We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.application/pdfeng© MIT Press (Publisher version at http://mitpress.mit.edu).info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01359Financial incentivesTrustPay transparencyBranchless bankinginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess