Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín2024-04-192024-04-192017Verdejo VM. Reasons to desire and desiring at will. Metaphilosophy. 2017;48(3):355-69. DOI: 10.1111/meta.122430026-1068http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59831There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude.application/pdfengThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Verdejo VM. Reasons to desire and desiring at will. Metaphilosophy. 2017;48(3):355-69, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12243. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12243beliefconsistency normsconative rationalityintrinsic/extrinsic rea-sonsinstrumental desireinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess