Hauk, EstherHurkens, SjaakUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-261999-07-01Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 106, Number 1, September 2002, pp. 66-90(25)http://hdl.handle.net/10230/737We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperforward inductionstrategic stabilityees setsindex theoryMicroeconomicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess