Motta, MassimoUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa2017-07-262017-07-261995-11-01Ricerche Economiche, 50, (1996), pp. 293-315http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20729D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integrated world economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that: 1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantage over foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policy game, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contrary to other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result, welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation. 4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition is formed.application/pdfengL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperLabour, Public, Development and Health Economicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess